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Concern about the extent to which Japanese investors
will continue to invest abroad has prompted attention
to understanding the determinants of Japanese capital
outflows. This paper discusses Japanese capital outflow
trends and their determinants during the 1980s. It high-
lights the roles ofexcess Japanese savings, U.S. govern-
mentbudgetdevelopments, andJapanesefinancial market
liberalization. It concludes that the massive Japanese
capital outflows during most of the 1980s are likely to
decline in the future.
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During the 1980s Japan became the world's largest
capital exporter. From a mere $10 billion in 1981, its net
long-term capital outflows rose to a peakof$137 billion in
1987, before declining to the still substantial level of $89
billion in 1989. As the world's largest capital exporter,
Japanese investors have been leading acquirers of U.S.
securities and other types of debt, with net long-term
capital outflows to the U.S. amounting to $54 billion
in 1989.
Many policymakers, especially in the United States,
have been concerned about the extent to which Japanese
investors will continue to invest abroad, in general, and in
dollar assets, in particular. IfJapanese portfolios become
too saturated with holdings of dollar assets, it is argued,
Japanese investors will curtailtheir demandfor U.S. assets
and/or require larger risk premiums for continuing to hold
these assets. Such behavior would adversely affect U.S.
financial markets by inducing higher U.S. interest rates
and a lower value ofthe dollar.
Understanding past and current determinants of Jap-
anese capital outflows is important for evaluating the
prospects for future outflows. The logic ofmacroeconomic
accounting implies that Japan's capital outflows are the
counterpartofits current account surpluses during the past
decade. A country's current account is, in essence, the
macroeconomic balance between national savings and
investment. To the extent that a country runs a current
account surplus by exporting (selling) more goods and
services than it imports (buys), it must lend the difference
to foreigners. Itdoes so by investingand acquiring an equal
amount of net claims on foreigners through its capital
account. Correspondingly, a country that imports (buys)
more than it exports (sells) must borrow the difference by
issuing liabilities to foreigners. Thus U.S. capital inflows
are the counterpart ofU.S. current account deficits.
Most discussion ofJapan's capacity and willingness to
finance U.S. current account deficits has focused on trade
in goods and services and factors that influence Japanese
net exports and U.S. net imports of goods and services,
such as relative price levels and income levels'! The logic
ofmacroeconomic accounting, however, implies thatcapi-
tal flows are also important. It suggests that relative
savings and investment levels and interest rates, factors
Economic Review / Spring 1991that more directly influence Japanese net demand for
foreign assets, are important as well.
From this perspective, the accumulation ofU.S. assets
by Japanese investors need not be viewed as purely resid-
ual and involuntary behavior necessary to finance the
ongoing excesses of U.S. imports of goods and services
over exports. Rather the increase in capital outflows from
Japan may atleast in part have arisen for other independent
reasons.
This article discusses recent trends and features of
Japan's net capital outflows during the 1980s and the major
factors that brought about their increase. It highlights the
roles ofboth macroeconomic and microeconomic factors,
particularly those independent factors that have directly
influenced Japan's capital account transactions.
On the macro level, underlying the rapid Japanese
accumulation ofoverseas assets during the 1980s has been
the emergence of a large excess of domestic saving over
domestic investment in Japan. Rising budgetdeficits and a
correspondingdemand for capital in the United Stateshave
played an important role as well. On the microeconomic
level, the process offinancial market liberalizationin Japan
permitted greater competition among individual financial
institutions and allowed more Japanese investors to engage
in international capital transactions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I looks at the
trend and composition of Japanese international capital
account transactions. Section II discusses the role ofmac-
roeconomic factors for the rise in net Japanese outflows.
Section III examines the role of microeconomic and in-
stitutional factors. Section IV discusses the outlook for the
magnitude offuture Japanese capital outflows.
I. Japanese International Transaction Trends
Current and Capital Account Overview inflows of capital invested in Japanese liabilities, all with
Table 1presents figures for broad categories of Japan's maturities of more than one year.) Net long-term capital
account outflows rose from $10 billion in 1981 to $137 international transaction flows for the period 1980-90.2 As
the figures indicate, Japan has experienced sustained cur- billion in 1987, before falling to $89 billion in 1989.
4 The
rent account surpluses since 1981. These surpluses have partial data available for 1990 indicate that this decline in
increasedrapidly, rising from $5 billion in 1981 to apeakof capital outflows is continuing.
5
$87 billion in 1987, roughly 4 percent of Japan's GNP. As shown inChart 1, since 1981, Japanese net long-term
Since then the current account surpluses have declined. investments have beenconsistently greaterthan the current
The rapid rise in Japan's current account surplus since account surpluses. Beginning in 1986, the magnitude by
1981 has had its counterpart in a greatly increased net which long-term investmentoutflows exceeded the current
outflow of capital, particularly in net long-term invest- account surpluses has been particularly large. This sug-
ments.3 (Net long-term investments are defined as gross gests that Japanese capital outflows reflect factors motivat-
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Note: Positive values indicate current account surplus or net capital outflows.
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Chart 2
Net Long-term Capital Outflows
(annual rates)
Composition ofLong-Term Capital Flows
The changes in Japan's net long-term capital outflows
during the 1980s primarily reflect movements in net se-
curities outflows. (See Chart 2.) Japan's net direct invest-
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Note: 'Other' includes trade credit and loans.
view that Japanese investors have acquired foreign assets change reserves, particularly in 1987 ($39.2 billion) as a
involuntarily merely to finance unbalanced trade in goods result ofefforts to slow the appreciation ofthe yen. Thus in
and services. these years monetary authorities, in addition to private
The net long-term capital outflows arising from the investors, helped finance Japan's current account sur-
purchase of foreign securities by Japanese investors have pluses. In 1989 this pattern reversed. Net reserve outflows
generally been accompanied by net short-term capital amounting to $12.8 billion accompanied efforts to dampen
inflows. (See Table 1.) Between 1986 and 1988 the short- the weakening of the value of the yen. Reserve outflows
term capital inflows were especially high. These capital continued in 1990.
inflows have been particularly associated with short-term
foreign borrowing by Japanese banks.
Net movements in Japan's official reserve assets have
reflected the foreign exchange intervention policies of
Japanese monetary authorities. Prior to 1985 these move-
ments were negligible. Between 1985 and 1988 Japanese
monetary authorities generally accumulated foreign ex-
20 Economic Review / Spring 1991stillaccountfor only about20percentoftotal netlong-term
capital outflows.6
On the outflow side, gross long-term foreign securities
purchases rose from $3.8 billion in 1980 to $102.0 billion
in 1986, fell offsomewhat in 1987 and 1988, before rising
again in 1989 to $113.3 billion. (See Chart 3.) Foreign
securities investment averaged 72 percent of long-term
capital outflows in 1986 and 1987, butfell to 59 percent in
1988 and 1989. Roughly 80 to 90 percentofJapanese gross
foreign securitiespurchaseshave beeninbonds, butatrend
towards more stock purchases has recently emerged.7
Onthe inflow side, purchasesofJapanese securities have
generally accounted for more than 90 percent of gross
long-term capital inflows. (See Chart 4.) These securities
inflows remained relatively constant from 1980 to 1985,
averaging $13 billion per year. Since 1986 they have
fluctuated more significantly, primarily in association with
movements in Japan's stock market, and rose dramatically
to $89 billion in 1989.8
Institutional Investors
As Table 2 indicates, most ofJapan's foreign securities
outflows are attributable to Japanese bank and nonbank
financial institutions. Theirpurchases offoreign securities
typically account for 60 to 70 percent of gross Japanese
long-term securities purchases. The remainderis attributa-
ble to nonfinancial firms and individuals, for which de-
tailed dataare not available, and is calculated as a residual.
Chart5 presents the ratios offoreign securities holdings
to total assets for different types of financial institutions.
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Note: 'Other' includes trade credit and loans.
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 21this ratio generally increased for all types of institutions
throughout the past decade. This suggests that factors
affecting the foreign investment behavior of Japanese
financial institutions have been important determinants of
Japanese outflows during the 1980s.
Despite the common trend of increase in the ratio of
foreign securities to total assets, there are differences inthe
magnitude of the ratio of foreign securities to total assets
among investors. In particular, as may be observed from
Chart 5, the ratio is high for insurance firms, trust ac-
counts, andinvestmenttrusts. The ratio for Japanese banks
is relatively low. This suggests that factors affecting the
allocation of funds among Japanese investors and their
ability to investabroad has played arole in the composition
ofJapanese capital outflows.
Geographic Composition ofSecurities Outflows
Where have Japanese investments beengoing? There are
no comprehensive direct statistics on the currency com-
position of Japanese foreign securities investments, but
indirect evidence is available.
Table 3 breaks down Japanese foreign securities invest-
ments, including both stocks and bonds, by the country in
which they are acquired.9 As the table indicates, although
the United States continues to attract a high percentage of
Japanese investment, the ratio peakedin 1985 at56percent
and has since beendeclining, with adiscernible sharp drop
in 1989. 10
However, a sizable proportion ofoverseas investments is
in Luxembourg andthe U.K., centers ofEurobond trading,
particularly in Eurodollar securities. In fact, almost all of
the investment in Luxembourg is in dollar-denominated
Eurobonds. The total share of securities in the U.S.and
Luxembourg, a rough proxy for dollar-denominated in-
vestments, peaked at 78 percent in 1985, but has slowly
declined to 66 percent in 1989.II
Available data on the currency composition of foreign
securities investments by institutional investors supports
the general inference from the aggregate data that dollar-
denominated assets dominate overseas Japanese invest-
ments. Deguchi (1987), for example, reports data on the
composition of foreign investment by Japanese life insur-
ance companies. He finds that at the end of 1986 these
firms held 57 percent oftheir foreign investment in dollar-
denominated securities.
The discussion in this section has identified several
22 Economic Review / Spring 1991Chart 5
Foreign Securities as a Percent of
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Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 23majorfeatures ofJapanese capitaloutflows. First, netlong-
term outflows have exceeded current account surpluses,
particularly since 1986. Most ofthese outflows are associ-
ated with foreign securities purchases. Second, netshort-
termcapital inflows have beensignificant, especially those
associated with Japanese banks. Third, most Japanese
institutional investors have significantly raised the ratio of
their foreign securities to asset holdings. Lastly, most of
these capital flows have been into dollar-denominated
assets.
Excess Japanese Savings
From national income account relationships, acountry's
net capital outflows equal its excess domestic savings. To
the extent that a country saves more than it invests domes-
tically, it must lend the difference to foreigners. Itdoes so
by exporting (selling) more goods and services than it
imports (buys), running a current account surplus, and
correspondingly investing and acquiring an equal amount
ofclaims on foreigners through its capital account.
The domestic savings balance can be broken into a
private saving balance and a government saving balance.
Thus net capital outflows, and correspondingly the current
II. Macroeconomic Determinants of Capital Outflows
The growth and composition of Japanese capital flows account surplus can be expressed as the sum ofthe excess
during the 1980s may be explained by a number offactors. of private savings over private investment and ofgovern-
The macroeconomic factors, discussed in this section, ment tax receipts over government expenditures.
include the emergence ofexcess domestic savings in Japan Chart 6 shows the patterns of private saving net of
and growing U.S. government budget deficits, as wen as investmentand government savinginJapan. Between 1980
changing exchange rate expectations and risk perceptions. and 1986, Japan's surplus ofprivate saving overinvestment
The microeconomic factors, which include the effects of averaged nearly 7 percent of GNP. Although Japan's pri-
Japanese financial liberalization, are discussed in the fol- vate savings rate has remainedrelatively high, comparedto
lowing section. other industrial countries during this period the .private
savings rate actually fell.l2 However, declining domestic
investmentgenerally offset the drop, leaving private saving
net ofinvestment relatively unchanged.
The decline in investment through the mid-1980s can be
attributedto thereduced domestic prospectsfor investment
arising from a deceleration in Japan's long-run growth rate
that began in the 1950s, and continued through the 1960s
and 1970s. Kasman (1987), for example, estimates that
Japan's potential real growth fell from 9 percent over the
period 1967-1973 to 4.5 percent over 1976-1986. Other
reasons that may have contributedto the drop in investment
include higher real interest rates, diminishing returns to
investment, and the rising price of urban land which
caused residential construction to fall.
Private Saving Net of Investment
Government Saving
Chart 6
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24 Economic Review / Spring 1991The reasons for the decline in savings also included
slower growth as well as the ongoing aging of Japan's
population. Japan's birth rate has fallen significantly in
recentyears. In1989, Japan's fertility rate fell to apost-war
low; the average Japanese woman ofchild-bearing age had
1.57children, down from 1.77 childrenin 1979 and4.54in
1949, well below the estimated 2.1 rate needed to prevent
the population from eventually declining.13 The resulting
slower growth in the number of labor force participants
who save relative to the number ofpeople entering retire-
ment who dissave has lowered the overall level ofprivate
saving.
With private excess savings relatively flat or falling for
much of the 1980s, most of the increase in Japan's net
capital outflows has been associated with an increase in
gdvernment saving (that is, government receipts minus
expenditures). Mainly because of reduced spending, the
Japanese government budget deficit has declined steadily,
since 1978, when it amounted to more than 8 percent of
GNP. It fell throughout the 1980s and turned into a small
surplus in 1988. This improvement in the government
budget balance reduced the public sector's demand for
domestic saving. Thus the shift in the flow of Japanese
government saving, combined with relatively high domes-
tic private saving and investment, resulted in excess Jap-
anese savings, in effect providing the resources for foreign
investment.
Since 1987, however, economic growth in Japan has
boomed. Domestic investmentrose to meet more favorable
opportunities. As a result, the gap between private saving
and investment fell sharply to 2 percent of GNP in 1988.
(Later figures are not yet available.) The fall in the magni-
tude of Japan's current account surpluses and capital
outflows that began in 1988 can be associated with this
decline in excess savings.
Financing U.S. Budget Deficits
In a global context, Japan's capital outflows are net
capitalinflows for the restofthe world. IntheUS., Japan's
largest external debtor, rising budget deficits from 1980 to
1985 and corresponding demand for capital in the U.S.
were also major factors in generating Japanese foreign
investment. 14 The US. budget deficit, which averaged
less than 2 percent of GNP in the 1970s, climbed to 5
percentdfGNPfollowing the 1981-83 tax cuts and defense
buildup. This in turn pushedup US. real interest rates and
attractedcapitalfromabroad, which induced the apprecia-
tion ofthe dollar against the yen. IS
The relationship between Japan and US. economic
activity is evident in trends followed by real long-term
interest rates during the 1980s. Chart 7 shows that US.
real interest rates (adjusted for expected inflation, as
proxied by the year-ahead actual change in prices) rose
sharply in 1981 and remained well above Japanese rates
over the first half ofthe decade.
The relatively higher return on US. financial assets
boosted ex ante demand for US. assets from abroad. De-
clining Japanese government borrowing, combined with
relatively loose monetary policy and falling interest rates
reduced the supply and attraction of Japanese domestic
investment outlets. This series ofdevelopments is consis-
tent with the movement ofnet capital outflows from Japan
Chart 7
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Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 25to the U.S. as well as the appreciation of the dollar that
occurred from 1980 to 1985.
After 1985, however, the relative interest rate levels do
not appear to explain Japan's pattern of capital flows as
well. As observed earlier, Japan's net long-term capital
outflows jumped substantially in 1986 to levels well above
its current account surpluses. Short-term capital inflows
rose sharply as well. It is precisely at this point in time,
however, that U.S. budget deficits began to decline, U.S.
interest rates fell, and the dollar began to drop. Other
factors must therefore have been at work.
Other Macroeconomic Factors
Exchange rate expectations are another component of
the. overall rate of return expected by Japanese interna-
tional portfolio investors and therefore of the relative
demand for dollar and yen assets. That Japanese investors
continued to desire to hold dollar-denominated foreign
assets after 1985 even though the U.S.-Japan interest rate
differential declined and the dollar depreciated can be
explained by the possibility that expectations of future
dollar depreciations were declining. In this instance, the
smaller expected decline in the future value of the dollar
against the yen would compensate somewhat for the lower
relative interest return to holding dollar assets. Indeed,
available survey evidence indicates that the expected one-
year-ahead depreciation of the dollar against the yen aver-
aged almost 11 percent over the period June 1981 to
December 1985, and declined to 6 percent in October1986
and to almost zero by February 1988.16
However, the results of more sophisticated empirical
analyses produce mixed results about the sensitivity of
Japaneseforeign capital demand to exchange rate-adjusted
interest differentials. Kawai and Okumura (1988) found
Japanese capital outflows depended positively on the ex-
change rate-adjusted (nominal) interest rate differential
between the U.S. and Japan during the period 1982-1983,
but not during 1984-1987. Kawai (1989) found stronger
evidence. that Japanese stock demand for foreign financial
assets depended significantly on the interest differential
oyerthe entire.period 1982-1987. Veda (1990), however,
found that the interest differential explained only a small
portion of.changes in the foreign securities component of
Japanese investment portfolios.
Another possible macroeconomic factor at work in-
cludes changes in perceived risk to holding foreign assets.
Specifically, the continuedaccumulationofdollarassets by
Japanese. investors, by leading to an undesirably large
share ofdollar assets in their portfolios, may lead them to
curtail their demand or to compel larger risk premiums for
continuing to hold these assets. The econometric work
cited above, using various proxies for risk, has found
some evidence that since 1985 Japanese investors have
responded more significantly to exchange risk.
There were, in fact, several episodes during which
Japanese purchases ofU.S. assets declined sharply. In late
1986 and early 1987, for example, anecdotal evidence
suggests thatJapanese private investors appearedto reduce
theirholdings ofdollar assets markedly in response to high
perceived dollar exchange risk. This decline in Japanese
private investments was offset in part by an increase in
Japaneseofficial intervention. By 1988, however, Japanese
private foreign investments"resumed at earlierhigh levels.
While macroeconomic factors, including interest rate
differentials, expected exchange rate depreciation, and
perceived risk have, to varying degrees, explained aspects
of Japan's pattern of capital outflows during the 1980s,
these factors do not appear to explain all aspects ofJapan's
capital transactions. In particular, they do not fully explain
the sharp rise in Japanese capital outflows and the emer-
gence ofshort-termcapital inflows beginning in 1986. Nor
do they explain the behavior of institutional investors. To
explain these features, we turn to microeconomic and
institutional factors.
III. Microeconomic Determinants of Capital Outflows
Anothermajor factor underlying the sharp rise incapital late 1970s induced depositors to shift their funds from low
outflows in Japan during the 1980s has been the ongoing interest, fixed rate deposits to relatively high-interest,
process offinancial market liberalization. There were two floating rate funds. The deregulation process was acceler-
aspects of this liberalization process: domestic deregula- ated following aMay 1984 U.S.-Japan agreement outlining
tion steps that led to greater competition for funds among specific actions for the Japanese government to liberalize
Japanesefinancial institutions, andthe lowering ofbarriers further its domestic capital market by deregulating interest
to the integration ofJapanese financial markets with world rates on large denomination deposits. l7
financial markets. The continuing liberalization of domestic capital mar-
Domestic interest rate liberalization and the develop- kets increased competition among Japanese financial in-
ment ofopen securities markets in Japan beginning in the stitutions for funds and accounts. As a result, Japanese
26 Economic Review / Spring 1991investors' demand increased for more opportunities to
obtain higher returns and diversify their portfolios both
domestically and internationally. Commercial banks, and
other institutions dealing in financial il1$truments still
subjectto interestrates restrictions, sufferedintheirability
toraise funds domestically relativetootherintermediaries,
such as insurance companies and pension funds, which
were able to offer unregulated financial instruments.
The relaxation in the early 1980s ofpreviously stringent
governmentcontrols on capital flows encouragedJapanese
foreign investment. The revision of capital control regu-
lations with the enactment of the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law in December 1980 generally
eliminated restrictions on individuals and nonfinancial
corporations, but ceiling restrictions on overseas in-
vestments by most Japanese financial institutions still
remained. 18
For example, investment trusts typically faced few or no
regulatory restrictions on foreign investments.19 On the
other hand, life insurance and other insurance companies
were permitted to hold a maximum of 10 percent oftheir
assets in foreign securities (including yen-denominated
foreign securities).20 Most otherfinancial institutions were
prohibited from investing abroad. As a result, foreign
securities investment by institutional investors was very
limited.21 For example, at the end of 1980 life insurance
firms held only 2.7 percent oftheir total assets in foreign
currency assets.
These restrictions were lifted gradually in the early
1980s. Pension trusts were allowed to hold foreign se-
curities up to 10 percent oftheir assets in 1981. The Postal
Life Insurance System (Kampo) was permitted to invest in
foreign bonds up to 10 percent of its assets in 1983.22 In
1984 holdings on foreign securities by certain trust funds
were relaxed.
However, high US. real interest rates and remaining
restrictions on institutional investors' behaviorstill pentup
demand among institutional investors for foreign assets. In
1986, Japan's Ministry of Finance moved to increase the
ceilings sharply andgreatly expandedthe opportunitiesfor
financial institutions to invest abroad. The limits on hold-
ings offoreign securities by life insurance companies and
pension trusts were raised from 10 to 25 percent of total
assets in March 1986 and to 30 percent in August 1986.
The ceiling for the Postal Insurance System was raised
from 10 percentto 20percentinthe same year. Alsoin 1986
loan trusts were allowed to invest up to 1 percent in
February and later (in June), up to 3 percent of assets in
foreign currency bonds.23
As the authorities raised the percentage of institutional
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
assets that could be invested, their foreign investment has
soared.·This trend suggests that much ofthe rapid growth
inJapan's foreign asset holdings during the 1980s, particu-
larlyafter 1986, in part represents a stock adjustment
towards desired levels thatfor regulatory and otherreasons
were not previously attainable.
Thepropensitiesofinsurancefirms andtrust accounts to
investabroadhave been relatively high for several reasons.
In particular, they have accumulated large amounts of
fund.stoinvestastheagingofthepopulationhas increased
thedemandfor insurance andpensions. Theeliminationof
mosttaxpreferences onbanksavings accounts in 1989 also
induced a rapid shift of funds available to life insurance
companies and trust funds. Consequently, over the last ten
years there has been an upward trend in the ratio ofassets
in these institutions relative to the total assets of all
Japanese financial institutions.
In addition, these institutions have long investment
horizons and a strong preference for assets that bear high
interest as a result ofaccounting rules that have generally
limited· policy payouts by life insurance companies, in
particular, to coupon and dividend earnings from invest-
ments.24 For most ofthe 1980s Japan's low inflation and
accompanying low interest rates made it difficultto obtain
high current returns by investing in domestic yen-denomi-
nated bonds. Moreover, most of the return on domestic
equities came in the form of capital appreciation rather
than dividends. This made investment in foreign currency
securities withhigh coupons and dividend yields attractive
for policy payoffs.25 The desire to generate income from
interest payments spurred investment in relatively high-
interest foreign bonds and high-dividend foreign stocks,
particularly in the US. for most ofthe 1980s, but also in
Canada,Australia, and the UK.26
Because of limits on allowable long-term foreign ex-
change exposure, Japanese bank purchases of foreign
currencydenominatedsecuritieshave beenrelatively small
in comparison to their total assets. At the same time
continuing restrictions on deposit interest rates in Japan
reduced the competitiveness of Japanese banks and their
ability to raise funds domestically. Consequently, the
growth of domestic demand deposits lagged behind loan
demand. To supplement their domestic deposits, Japanese
banks used borrowings from offshore branches in London
and the U.S. It is estimated that in 1987 one half to two-
thirds ofthe funds borrowed abroad by Japanese banks in
the U.S. were reloaned to parent banks in Japan (Terrell
1990). This accords with the pattern of significantly high
short-termcapitalinflows toJapanpointedoutinSection1.
However, beginning in 1988, continued liberalization of
27deposit interest rates payable in the domestic Japanese
market increased the share ofbank deposits with unregu-
latedrates from less than 20 percentto almost 50percent in
1989. As aresult, foreign borrowingby Japanese banks has
diminished significantly.27
IV. Future Japanese Capital Outflows
The rise in Japanese capital outflows during most ofthe
1980s is attributable to a combination of excess domestic
savings, U.S. budgetdevelopments, and Japanese financial
liberalization. The capacity and willingness of Japanese
investors to invest more in foreign assets, particularly in
the U.S. , depends on how prevalent these factors will be in
the future. Since 1988 there is evidence of significant
decline in Japan's current account surpluses and capital
outflows. This decline can be largely attributed to the
dramatic rise in domestic investment between 1987 and
1989, combined with a continued fall in savings. However,
extrapolating into the future is difficult.
Over the long run, the magnitude of Japan's excess do-
mestic savings will depend significantly on demographic
factors affecting Japan's savings rate, on investmenttrends,
and on future Japanese government budget policies. Ja-
pan's birth rate is currently among the lowest in the world.
It is estimated that over the next 30 years Japan's labor
force could decline by as much as 10 million and that the
proportion of the population over 65 years old will rise
from its current level of11.5 percent to above 20 percent. 28
The aging of the population is expected to reduce further
thelevel ofJapan's saving as the olderdissaving population
dominates the younger savers. This decline in saving in the
long run will tend to reduce Japan's capital outflows.
Future investment and government policy actions are
harder to project. Higher interest rates in Japan since 1989
have begun to dampen investment. The dramatic stock
market decline in the first halfof 1990 presumably is also
having an adverse effect. Recent legislation intended to
expand future Japanese fiscal spending should tend to
reduce capital outflows. On balance, the excess ofdomes-
tic saving over investment and new Japanese foreign in-
vestment should diminish during the 1990s.
The continuedliberalizationofJapan's financial markets
will probably be a less significant factor for capital out-
flows in the future. The deregulation of Japan's domestic
financial markets is continuing. However, barriers to inter-
national capital flows are virtually gone. In particular,
ceilings on foreign securities holdings ofJapanese institu-
tions are no longer binding.
It is difficult, however, to evaluate how much future
increase may occurin the desired portfolio share offoreign
investments by Japanese investors. Some idea can be
obtained by comparing Japanese portfolio share figures
with corresponding figures in other countries. It is esti-
28
mated that 6.5 percent of Japan's total secunties were
invested abroad in 1988, up from 4 percent in 1983. Even
so, Japanese investors remain less diversified than inves-
torsinanumberofothercountries. For example, investors
inthe UK. and Germany held 22 and 15 percent, respec-
tively, oftheirsecurities abroad. 0.S. investors held only 2
percent oftheir total securities holdings abroad, but this
may be attributed to the greater diversification benefits
provided by the US. economy.29 This evidence suggests
Japanese investors may want to diversify further into
foreign assets in the future.
Other available evidence compares the shares offoreign
investment in the total assets of private pension funds for
1980 and 1986 in several countries. This evidence indicates
that the international diversification of pension funds has
proceeded rapidly in the 1980s. In 1986, the UK. had the
highest share (20 percent) followed by Australia (15 per-
cent); Japan held 10 percent. However, all other countries,
including Canada, Switzerland, Germany, the 0.S., and
France, had lower shares than Japan. On the basis of this
evidence, it is difficult to expect a continued rapid rise in
the share of foreign investment by Japanese institutional
investors in coming years. (See Fukao and Okina (1989».
Even without any further increases in the portfolio share of
these investments, the magnitude of foreign securities
purchases by Japanese institutional and noninstitutional
investors is likely to remain high in the near future, as
long as these institutions continue to receive new funds for
investment.
In the near term, most Japanese investments should
continue to be in dollar-denominated assets because ofthe
relative thinness of other markets. Thus the desire of
Japanese investors to acquire additional dollar-denomi-
nated assets at current yen exchange rates and interest
differentials should not be underestimated. Nevertheless,
Japanese purchases of U.S. securities likely will grow
more slowly in the medium and long term as Japanese
investors adjust their portfolios to include more European
currency-denominated assets in light of developments in
Europe, including the reunification ofGermany and ongo-
ing European Community financial reforms. Consequent-
1y' the 0.S. will face greater global competition for funds
than in the past. Accordingly, the terms ofexternal finance
for the United States may not be as favorable as in recent
years.
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1, See, for example, Reinhardt (1986),
2, Figures for 1990 are for the first three quarters of the
year and are expressed at an annual rate,
3, Japanese international transaction statistics follow a
nationality definition of residency, Thus, for example,
bonds issued outside Japan by Japanese residents are
recorded as capital inflows, In contrast, U,S. international
transaction statistics follow a geographic definition of
residency. Consequently, they do notdefine bonds issued
Qutside the U.S. by U,S. residents as capital inflows.
4, .In 1986 and 1987 net long-term capital outflows aver-
aged more than 6 percent of GNP,
5. There is some past evidence of a seasonal increase in
demand for foreign assets by Japanese investors, Hence
the annualized figures for 1990 based on data forthe first
three quarters of the year may underestimate the figures
for the full year,
6, Japan's capital flow figures have become more difficult
to interpret as more foreign securities investment takes
place through the foreign subsidiaries of Japanese finan-
cial institutions, such as life insurance firms and trust
banks, These flows are often reported either as direct
investment flows or as loans from parent firms in Japan,
rather than as securities investment flows, It is estimated
that roughly one-half of all transactions by trust banks and
one-third of all transactions by life insurance companies
are conducted directly with overseas securities com-
panies (Okumura, 1988), Thus some of the rise in gross
direct Investment and loan outflows from Jaoan (incltJrlArl
in the "Other" category in Charts 2 and 3) in recenty;;r~
may be due in part to these transactions,
7. A small portion of long-term foreign securities pur-
chases are for bonds issued pUblicly in Japan by nonresi-
dents, primarily denominated in yen (samurai bonds),
8, In 1988 and 1989, purchases of Japanese bonds also
rose sharply, primarily due to a rise in the issuance of
external bonds, i,e" yen-denominated or foreign cur-
rency-denominated bonds issued outside of Japan by
residents,
9, It should be noted that these overseas investment
figures from the Ministry of Finance exclude yen-denomi-
nated foreign bonds issued by nonresidents in Japan
(samurals), but Include foreign-currency denominated
bonds issued by nonresidents in Tokyo (shogun bonds);
the former are included in the Bank of Japan capital
outflow statistics contained in earlier charts,
10, A major factor for the surge of investments in the U,S,
in, 1985 "'!as the abolition in June 1984 of the 30 percent
withholding tax on U,S, bonds held by foreign investors.
11, Much of the Eurodollar securities purchased by Japa-
nese investors are in fact issues by Japanese firms.
Investment in Eurodollar bonds was particularly facilitated
by the liberalization in April 1984 of the conditions under
which foreign-currency denominated bonds could be is-
sued by Japanese residents, This allowed Japanese firms
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
to .issue them as swap bonds, that is bonds combined
with long-term forward currency contracts, The Eurodollar
bonds thus issued have been largely purchased byJap-
anese institutional investors.
Between 1987 and mid-1989 Japanese firms issued
nearly $100 million in Eurodollar warrant bonds, which
gave investors the right to buythe issuing firm's stock at a
setprice during aspecified period, During the Tokyo stock
market boom, warrant bonds provided Japanese firms a
relatively inexpensive way to raise money, since investors
were willing to accept lower interest payments in ex-
change for the right to buy stock below market prices,
Most of these warrant issues were in fact repatriated and
repo~ed as foreign bond and equity purchases by Japa-
nese Investors, Adjusting net foreign securities purchases
for warrant repatriation reduces estimates of Japanese
Investment abroad by $5 to $10 billion each quarter in
1989. See Napier (1989),
12, Net household saving in Japan fell from a peak of 23
percent of disposable income in 1976 to 18 percent in
1980,16 percent in 1985, and 15 percent in 1989. In 1989
the household saving rate was 12 percentin Germany and
France, 6 percent in the U,S., and 5 percent in the UK
(OECD Economic Outlook, June 1990, Table R12, p. 192.)
It should be noted that aggregate private savings include
corporate retained earnings in addition to household
savings,
13, The corresponding figure in 1989 was 1,87 forthe U,S,
and 1,28 for West Germanv. (U.S. News andWorldRAnnrt
December 24, 1990 and'Economist, January 26', '1991):
~4. Glick (1988), using atwo-country model of saving and
Inv~s,tment b~havior, estimates that the rising U,S, bUdget
defiCits explained roughly half of the increase in Japan's
current account surplus between 1981 and 1986.
15. An alternative explanation sometimes given for the
increase in U.S, real interest rates in the early 1980s is that
U,S, investment demand increased in response to the
more favorable treatment of business fixed investment in
the 1981 tax bill, However, the supporting evidenceforthis
view is doubtful. See Frankel (1988),
16, The survey evidence comes from the Economist-
affiliated Financial Report, See Frankel (1988). That the
dollar actually depreciated continuously against the yen
from its peak in February 1985 through the beginning of
1988 resulted in significant foreign exchange losses for
Japanese investors in U,S, assets,
17, The terms of the agreement were released in a docu-
ment called the "Report of the Joint Working Group on
Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Issues,"
18, Evidence of the role of the existence of residual con-
trols on capital outflows from Japan is provided by the
existence of a negative differential between the 3-month
Gensaki interest rate that could be earned in Tokyo and
the 3-month Euroyen interest rate that could be earned
offshore in London, See Frankel (1984),
2919. One set of funds, Domestic and Foreign Security
Funds (Naigaisai) can invest both at home and abroad
without any ceilings at all on foreign securities holdings.
Otherfunds arelimited to having no more than 50percent
oftheir totalassets in foreign investments.Tokkin funds, in
particlJlar, face no restrictions on investing inhigh.yield·
ingforeignbond$.
20. Foreign.currency·denominated domestic bonds and
foreign·currency deposits were not subjectto this limit.
Between 1982 and 1986 limitations also applied to allow·
able increases. in the purchase of foreign bonds as. a
percentofthe increase .in total assets; these limits were
dropped in 1986. Atthe same time, limits on otherforeign
currency assets, such as deposits, real estate, and for·
eign clJrrency denominated. domestic.bonds.isslJed. by
Japanese firms {sushi bonds) became subject to the
same limits in relation to total assets.
21. One response to the 10 percent limit on the assets
of insurance and pension funds that could be invested
abroad was investment in foreign currency·denominated
bonds issued by Japanese firms abroad (sushi bonds).
Such issues were treated as domestic issues in Japan
and hence were not subject to the ceilings on foreign
investment.
22. This limit did not include yen·denominated foreign
bonds in the case of pension trusts. Capital outflow re·
strictions on the Postal Insurance system and the Postal
Savings System are set by the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications, not by the Ministry of Finance.
23. Investment in either domestic or foreign stocks is not
allowed by loan trusts. The foreign investment ceiling for
loan trusts was raised to 5 percent in 1989.
30
24. Capital gains from stock and bond purchases, could
notbeused for policypayments, buttheycould be used to
offset foreign exchange losses.
25.·· One way··. around the restriction on capita! gains
was through foreign subsidiaries since profits repatriated
through subsidiaries are considered income instead .of
capital gains. Asa reslJlt,a number of Japanese life
insurance firms have established. foreign subsidiaries.
26.• Becauseoftheir relatively low interestrates for mostof
the 1980s, OM and Swiss franc assets make up a neglig·
ible share.offoreign securities holdings.
The capital gains restriction has led to charges that
Japanese companies have at times played havoc with
certain U.S. stocks that pay high dividends, such as utility
companies. Japanese firms have often bought and sold
foreign stocks simply to obtain the dividend payment,
even.ifitmeant taking a capitalloss. The companiesblJY
thestock just in timeto claimthedividend and then sell it at
acapital loss. Because more than one company has been
able to claim the dividend on a single share of an Ameri·
can company on the same day, trading in such stocks was
often remarkably heavy on the days in question.
27. To some extent shorHerm borrowing by Japanese
institutions may also be associated with strategies to
hedge foreign·exchange exposure of long·term foreign
asset positions. The decline in foreign borrowing since
1988 may reflect greateruse ofoff·balance sheet hedging
strategies involving, for example, forward contracts.
28. U.S. News and World Report, December 24,1990.
29. J.P. Morgan, World Financial Markets, November 22,
1989, "Government Bonds and Global Diversification."
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